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Abstract
All-pay auctions, a common mechanism for various human and agent
interactions, suffers, like many other mechanisms, from the possibility of
players’ failure to participate in the auction. We model such failures, and
fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, we present a sym-
metric equilibrium and show that under some conditions the equilibrium
is unique. We reveal various properties of the equilibrium, such as the lack
of influence of the most-likely-to-participate player on the behavior of the
other players. We perform this analysis with two scenarios: the sum-profit
model, where the auctioneer obtains the sum of all submitted bids, and
the max-profit model of crowdsourcing contests, where the auctioneer can
only use the best submissions and thus obtains only the winning bid.
Furthermore, we examine various methods of influencing the probabil-
ity of participation such as the effects of misreporting one’s own proba-
bility of participating, and how influencing another player’s participation
chances changes the player’s strategy.
1 Introduction
Auctions have been the focus of much research in economics, mathematics and
computer science, and have received attention in the AI and multi-agent com-
munities as a significant tool for resource and task allocation. Beyond explicit
auctions, as performed on the web (e.g., eBay) and in auction houses, auctions
also model various real-life situations in which people (and machines) interact
and compete for some valuable item. For example, companies advertising dur-
ing the U.S. Superbowl are, in effect, bidding to be one of the few remembered
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by the viewer, and are thus putting in tremendous amounts of money in order
to create a memorable and unique event for the viewer, overshadowing the other
advertisers.
A particularly suitable auction for modeling various scenarios in the real
world is the all-pay auction. In this type of auction, all participants announce
bids, and all of them pay those bids, while only the highest bid wins the product.
Candidates applying for a job are, in a sense, participating in such a bidding
process, as they put in time and effort preparing for the job interview, while only
one of them is selected for the job. This is a max-profit auction, as the auctioneer
(employer, in this case), receives only the top bid. In comparison, a workplace
with an “employee of the month” competition is a sum-profit auctioneer, as it
enjoys the fruits of all employees’ labour, regardless of who won the competition.
The explosion in mass usage of the web has enabled many more all-pay
auction-like interactions, including some involving an extremely large number
of participants. For example, various crowdsourcing contests, such as the Net-
flix challenge, involve many participants putting in effort, with only the best
performing one winning a prize. Similar efforts can be seen throughout the
web, in TopCoder.com, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Bitcoin mining and other
frameworks.
However, despite the research done on all-pay auctions in the past few
years [DiPalantino and Vojnovic´, 2009, Chawla et al., 2012, Lev et al., 2013],
some basic questions about all-pay auctions remain — in a full information set-
ting, any equilibrium has bidders’ expected profit at 0, raising, naturally, the
question of why bidders would participate.
Several extensions to the all-pay auction model have been suggested in order
to answer this question. For example, Lev et al. [2013] showed that allowing
bidders to collude enables the cooperating bidders to have a positive expected
profit, at the expense of others bidders or the auctioneer. This paper addresses
this question by suggesting a model in which the bidders have a positive expected
profit.
Furthermore, in all-pay auctions, the number of bidders is a crucial infor-
mation in order to bid according to the equilibrium [Baye et al., 1996]. Hence,
the number of participants must be known to the bidder. We suggest a relax-
ation of this assumption by allowing the possibility of bidders’ failure, that is,
there is a probability that a bidder will not be able to participate in the auc-
tion. Therefore, we assume that the number of potential bidders and the failure
probability of every bidder are common knowledge, but not the exact number
of participants.
As most large-scale all-pay auction mechanisms have variable participation,
we believe this helps capture a large family of scenarios, particularly for online,
web-based, situations and the uncertainty they contain. We propose a sym-
metric equilibrium for this situation, we show when it is unique and prove its
various properties. Somewhat surprisingly, allowing failures makes the expected
profit for bidders positive, justifying their participation.
We start by reviewing related work in Section 2. We then introduce the
model with and without failures. In Section 4, we first examine the case where
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each bidder has a different failure probability. Next, in Section 5, we study
the potential manipulations possible in this model, such as announcing a false
probability (e.g., saying that you will put all your time into a TopCoder.com
project) and changing the probability of others (e.g., sabotaging their car). Fi-
nally, in Section 6, as calculations in this general case are complex, we examine
situations where bidders have the same failure probability (as is possible when
weather or web server failure, for example, are the main determinant of partic-
ipation), enabling us to detail more information about the equilibrium in this
state. In those situations we examine the effectiveness of changing the partici-
pation probability for all the bidders (e.g., convincing a deity to make it snow
or attacking the server).
2 Related Work
Initial research on all-pay auction was in the political sciences, modeling lobby-
ing activities [Hillman and Riley, 1989], but since then, much analysis (especially
that dealing with the Revenue Equivalence Theorem) has been done on game-
theoretic auction theory. When bidders have the same value distribution for
the item, Maskin and Riley [2003] showed that there is a symmetric equilibrium
in auctions where the winner is the bidder with the highest bid. A significant
analysis of all-pay auctions in full information settings was Baye et al. [1996],
showing (aided by Hillman and Riley [1989]) the equilibrium states in various
cases of all-pay auctions, and noting that most valuations (apart from the top
two), are not relevant to the winner’s strategies.
More recent work has extended the basic model. Lev et al. [2013] addressed
issues of mergers and collusions, while several others directly addressed crowd-
sourcing models. DiPalantino and Vojnovic´ [2009] detailed the issues stemming
from needing to choose one auction from several, and Chawla et al. [2012] dealt
with optimal mechanisms for crowdsourcing.
The early major work on failures in auctions was McAfee and McMillan
[1987], followed soon after by Matthews [1987], which introduced bidders who
are not certain of how many bidders there will actually be at the auction. Their
analysis showed that in first-price auctions (like our all-pay auction), risk averse
bidders prefer to know the numbers, while it is the auctioneer’s interest to hide
that number. In the case of neutral bidders (such as ours), their model claimed
that bidders were unaffected by the numerical knowledge. Dyer et al. [1989]
claimed that experiments that allowed “contingent” bids (i.e., one submits sev-
eral bids, depending on the number of actual participants) supported these
results. Menezes and Monteiro [2000] presented a model where auction partici-
pants know the maximal number of bidders, but not how many will ultimately
participate. However, the decision in their case was endogenous to the bidder,
and therefore a reserve price has a significant effect in their model (though ul-
timately without change in expected revenue, in comparison to full-knowledge
models). In contrast to that, our model, which assumes a little more information
is available to the bidders (they know the maximal number of bidders, and the
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probability of failure), finds that in such a scenario, bidders are better off not
having everyone show up, rather than knowing the real number of contestants
appearing. Empirical work done on actual auctions [Lu and Yang, 2003] seems
to support some of our theoretical findings (though not specifically in all-pay
auction settings).
In our settings, the failure probabilities are public information and the fail-
ures are independent. Such failures have also been studied in other game-
theoretic fields. Meir et al. [2012] studied the effects of failures in congestion
games, and showed that in some cases, the failures could be beneficial to the so-
cial welfare. Some earlier work focused on agent redundancy and agent failures
in cooperative games, studying various solution concepts in such games (see,
e.g., [Bachrach et al., 2011, 2014]).
3 Model
We consider an all-pay auction with a single auctioned item that is commonly
valued by all the participants. This is a restricted case of the model in Baye
et al. [1996], where players’ item valuation could be different.
Formally, we assume that each of the n bidders issues a bid of bi, i = 1, . . . , n,
and all bidders value the item at 1. The highest bidders win the item and divide
it among themselves, while the rest lose their bid. Thus, bidder i’s utility from
a combination of bids (b1, . . . , bn) is given by:
pii(b1, . . . , bn) =

1∣∣∣∣arg maxj bj
∣∣∣∣ − bi i ∈ arg maxj bj
−bi i /∈ arg max
j
bj .
(1)
We are interested in a symmetric equilibrium, which in this case, without
possibility of failure, is unique [Baye et al., 1996, Maskin and Riley, 2003]. It
is a mixed equilibrium with full support of [0, 1], so that each bidder’s bid is
distributed in [0, 1] according to the same cumulative distribution function F ,
with the density function f (since it is non-atomic, tie-breaking is not an issue).
As we compare this case to that of no-failures, this is a case similar to that
presented in Baye et al. [1996], where various results on the behavior of non-
cooperative bidders have been provided. We briefly give an overview of the
results without failures in Subsection 3.1.
When we allow bidders to fail, we assume that each of them has a probability
of participating — pi ∈ [0, 1]. As a matter of convenience, we shall order the
bidders according to their probabilities, so 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pn ≤ 1. If a
bidder fails to participate, its utility is 0.
3.1 Auctions without Failures
The expected utility of any participant with a bid b is:
pi(b) = (1− b) · Pr(winning | b) + (−b) · Pr(losing | b) (2)
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Variable No Failures
Expected bid 1n
[Variance]
[
1
2n−1 − 1n2
]
Bidder utility 0
[Variance]
[
n−1
n(2n−1)
]
Sum-profit principal utility 1
[Variance]
[
n
2n−1 − 1n
]
Max-profit principal utility
n
2n−1
[Variance]
[
n(n−1)2
(3n−2)(2n−1)2
]
Table 1: The values, in expectation, of some of the variables when there is no
possibility of failure
where Pr(winning | b) and Pr(losing | b) are the probabilities of winning or
losing the item when bidding b, respectively. In a symmetric equilibrium with
n players, each of the bidders chooses their bid from a single bid distribution
with a probability density function fn(x) and a cumulative distribution function
Fn(x). A player who bids b can only win if all the other n − 1 players bid at
most b, which occurs with probability Fn−1n (b). Thus, the expected utility of a
player bidding b is given by:
pi (b) = (1− b)Fn−1n (b)− b
(
1− Fn−1n (b)
)
= Fn−1n (b)− b. (3)
The unique symmetric equilibrium is defined by the CDF Fn(x) = x
1
n−1 [Baye
et al., 1996]. This equilibrium has full support, and all points in the support
yield the same expected utility to a player, pi(0) = pi(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Since
pi(0) = 0, this means that for all bids, pi (b) = 0. The various properties of an
auction without failures can be found in Table 1 [Lev et al., 2013].
4 Every Bidder with Own Failure Probability
In this section, we assume that each bidder has its own probability for partici-
pating in the auction, with 0 ≤ p1 ≤ . . . ≤ pn ≤ 1. We can assume without loss
of generality, that each bidder has a positive participating probability, that is,
p1 > 0. If this is not the case, we can remove from the auction the bidders with
zero probability of participating.
4.1 Equilibrium Properties
Before we present a symmetric Nash equilibrium, we will characterize any Nash
equilibrium.
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Theorem 1. In common values all-pay auction when the item value is 1, if
pn−1 < 1 then there is a unique Nash equilibrium, in which the expected profit
of every participating bidder is
∏n−1
j=1 (1− pj). Furthermore, there exists a con-
tinuous function z :
[
0, 1−∏n−1j=1 (1− pj)] → [0, 1], such that when a bidder i,
has a positive density over an interval, they bid according to Fi (x) =
z(x)+pi−1
pi
over that interval, and if pi = pj then Fi = Fj.
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found at the appendix. As Theorem 1 applies
to the case where pn−1 < 1, we now deal with the other case.
Theorem 2. In common values all-pay auction when the item value is 1, if
pn−1 = 1 then in every Nash equilibrium the expected profit of every participating
bidder is 0. At least two bidders with p = 1 randomize over [0, 1] with each other
player i randomizing continuously over (bi, 1], bi > 0, and having an atomic
point at 0 of αi (0). There exists a continuous function z (x) : [0, 1] → [0, 1],
such that when a bidder, i, has a positive density over an interval, they bid
according to Fi (x) =
z(x)+pi−1
pi
over that interval. For every i, the atomic point
at 0 is equals to Fi (0).
When there are at least two bidders with p = 1, the auction approaches the
case without failures. The proof of Theorem 2 is a generalization of the case
without agent failures [Baye et al., 1996], and can be found at the appendix.
4.2 Symmetric Equilibrium
We are now ready to present a symmetric Nash equilibrium, we assume that
0 < p1 ≤ · · · ≤ pn ≤ 1. If pn−1 < 1, from Theorem 1 it follows that the
equilibrium is unique. If pn−1 = 1 the equilibrium is not unique, except for two
bidders with p = 1, every bidder can place an arbitrary atomic point at 0. In
the equilibrium that we present, every bidder has an atomic point at 0 of 0, and
thus the equilibrium is symmetric.
In order to simplify the calculations, we add a “dummy” bidder, with index 0,
and p0 = 0, adding a bidder that surely will not participate in the auction, does
not effect the other bidders and therefore does not influence the equilibrium.
We begin by defining a few helpful functions. First, we define λ =
n−1∏
j=1
(1− pj),
and we define the following expressions for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1:
Hk (x) =
(
λ+ x∏k−1
j=0 (1− pj)
) 1
n−k
(4)
and
sk = (1− pk)n−k
k−1∏
j=0
(1− pj)− λ. (5)
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For the virtual “0” index, we use s0 = 1 − λ. Note that because the pi’s are
ordered, so are the si’s: 1 ≥ s0 ≥ s1 ≥ . . . ≥ sn−1 = 0. 1
We are now ready to define the CDFs for our equilibrium, for every bidder
1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1:
Fi (x) =

1 x ≥ s0
H1(x)+pi−1
pi
x ∈ [s1, s0)
...
...
Hk(x)+pi−1
pi
x ∈ [sk, sk−1)
...
...
Hi(x)+pi−1
pi
x ∈ [si, si−1)
0 x < si.
(6)
Fn, uniquely, while it is very similar to Fn−1 in its piecewise composition, has
an atomic point at 0 of 1− pn−1pn , so:
Fn (x) =

1 x ≥ s0
H1(x)+pn−1
pn
x ∈ [s1, s0)
...
...
Hk(x)+pn−1
pn
x ∈ [sk, sk−1)
...
...
Hn−1(x)+pn−1
pn
x ∈ (sn−1, sn−2)
1− pn−1pn x = 0
0 x < 0.
(7)
Note that all CDFs are continuous and piecewise differentiable,2 and when pi =
pj it follows that Fi = Fj ; therefore, this is a symmetric equilibrium. The
intuition behind this equilibrium is that bidders that participate rarely will
usually bid high, while those that frequently participate in auctions with less
competition would more commonly bid low.
Theorem 3. The strategy profile F1, . . . , Fn defined in Equations (6) and (7) is
an equilibrium, in which the expected profit of the bidders, if they haven’t failed
is λ.
Proof. In the course of proving this is indeed a equilibrium, we shall calculate
the expected utility of the bidders when they participate.
1An equivalent definition of sk is sk = (1− pk)n−k−1
∏k
j=0 (1− pj) − λ, we alternate
between those two definitions.
2Note that when
∏k−1
j=0 (1− pj) = 0, and Hk is undefined for some k, then there is no
range for which that Hk is used.
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When bidder i bids according to this distribution, i.e., x ∈ [sk, sk−1) for
1 ≤ k ≤ i:
pii (x) = (1− x)
n∏
j=1;j 6=i
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj)− x
(
1−
n∏
j=1;j 6=i
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj)
)
=
n∏
j=1;j 6=i
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj)
n∏
j=k;j 6=i
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj)
n∏
j=1;j 6=i
Hk (x)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj)Hk (x)n−k − x
=
k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj)
(
λ+x∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
)
− x
= λ.
(8)
If bidder i bids outside their support, i.e., x ∈ for i + 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, the same
equation becomes:
pii(x) =
k−1∏
j=1;j 6=i
(1− pj)
n∏
j=k
Hk (x)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1;j 6=i
(1− pj)
(
λ+x∏k−1
j=1 (1−pj)
)n−k+1
n−k
− x
= λ+x1−pi
(
λ+x∏k−1
j=1 (1−pj)
) 1
n−k
− x.
(9)
Now,
x < sk−1 = (1− pk−1)n−k+1
∏k−2
j=1 (1− pj)− λ
= (1− pk−1)n−k
∏k−1
j=1 (1− pj)− λ
(10)
and hence λ+ x < (1− pk−1)n−k
∏k−1
j=1 (1− pj). Plugging it all together,
pii(x) <
λ+x
1−pi
(
(1−pk−1)n−k
∏k−1
j=1 (1−pj)∏k−1
j=1 (1−pj)
) 1n−k
− x
= λ+x1−pi (1− pk−1)− x
= (λ+ x) pi−pk−11−pi + λ.
(11)
Finally, as i+1 ≤ k, pi ≤ pk−1, hence pi−pk−1 ≤ 0, and therefore pii(x) < λ.
4.3 Profits
When a bidder actually participates their expected utility, in the equilibrium, is
λ, and therefore the overall expected utility for bidder i is piλ (which, naturally,
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decreases with n). Notice that, as is to be expected, a bidder’s profit rises the
less reliable their fellow bidders are, or the fewer participants the auction has.
However, the most reliable of the bidders does not affect the profits of the rest.
If a bidder can set its own participation rate, if there is no bidder with pj = 1,
that is the best strategy; otherwise, the optimal probability should be 12 , as that
maximizes pi(1− pi)
∏n−1
j=1;j 6=i(1− pj).
4.3.1 Expected Bid
In order to calculate the expected bid by each bidder, we need to calculate the
bidders’ equilibrium PDF, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1:
fi (x) =

0 x ≥ s0
(λ+x)
2−n
n−1
pi(n−1) x ∈ [s1, s0)
...
...
(λ+x)
k+1−n
n−k
pi(n−k)
∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
1
n−k
x ∈ [sk, sk−1)
...
...
(λ+x)
i+1−n
n−i
pi(n−i)
∏i−1
j=0(1−pj)
1
n−i
x ∈ [si, si−1)
0 x < si
(12)
and fn (x) =
pn−1
pn
fn−1 (x). In the equilibrium, the expected bid of bidder i, for
1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 is:
E [bidi] =
i∑
k=1
sk−1∫
sk
xfi (x) dx. (13)
Theorem 4. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1:
E [bidi] =
1
pi
(
1
n
+
i∑
k=1
(1− pk)n−k
∏k
j=1 (1− pj)
(n− k) (n− k + 1)
− (1− pi)
n−i∏i
j=1 (1− pj)
n− i − piλ
) (14)
and
E [bidn] =
pn−1
pn
E [bidn−1] . (15)
The expected bid decreases with n, indicating, as in the no-failure model,
that as more bidders participate, the chance of losing increases, causing bidders
to lower their exposure. The proof of Theorem 4 can be found at the appendix.
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4.3.2 Auctioneer - Sum-Profit Model
In the equilibrium, the expected profit of the auctioneer in the sum-profit model
is given by:
E [AP ] =
n∑
i=1
piE [bidi] . (16)
When summing over all bidders, we receive a much simpler expression.
Theorem 5. The sum-profit auctioneer’s equilibrium profits are:
n∑
i=1
piE [bidi] = 1− λ
(
1 +
n−1∑
i=1
pi
)
. (17)
In this case, growth with n is monotonic increasing, and hence, any addition
to n is a net positive for the sum-profit auctioneer. The proof can be found at
the appendix.
4.3.3 Auctioneer - Max-Profit Model
To calculate a max-profit auctioneer’s profits, we need to first define the max-
profit auctioneer’s profits equilibrium CDF:
G (x) =
n∏
i=1
(piFi (x) + 1− pi) (18)
That is,
G (x) =

1 x ≥ s0
(λ+ x)
n
n−1 x ∈ [s1, s0)
...
...
(λ+x)
n−k+1
n−k∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
1
n−k
x ∈ [sk, sk−1)
...
...
(λ+x)2∏n−2
j=0 (1−pj)
x ∈ [sn−1, sn−2)
0 x < 0.
(19)
This is differentiable, and hence we can find g (x) = ∂∂xG (x) and the max-profit
auctioneer’s expected profit.
Theorem 6. In the equilibrium, the max-profit auctioneer’s profits are:
E [AP ] =
s0∫
sn−1
xg (x) dx
=
n
2n− 1 − λ+
n−1∑
k=1
(
(1− pk)2n−2k−1
∏k
j=1(1− pj)2
4(n− k)2 − 1
)
.
(20)
10
From Theorem 6 we can see that the max-profit auctioneer would prefer to
minimize λ, have two reliable bidders (pn = pn−1 = 1), and the other n − 2
bidders as unreliable as possible. The proof of Theorem 6 can be found at the
appendix.
Example 1. Consider how four bidders interact. Our bidders have participation
probability of p1 =
1
3 , p2 =
1
2 , p3 =
3
4 and p4 = 1. Let us look at each bidder’s
equilibrium CDFs:
F1(x) =

1 x ≥ 1112
3
(
1
12 + x
) 1
3 − 2 x ∈ [ 23108 , 1112)
0 x < 23108
F2(x) =

1 x ≥ 1112
2
(
1
12 + x
) 1
3 − 1 x ∈ [ 23108 , 1112)
2
(
3( 112+x)
2
) 1
2
− 1 x ∈ [ 112 , 23108)
0 x < 112
F3(x) =

1 x ≥ 1112
4
3
(
1
12 + x
) 1
3 − 13 x ∈
[
23
108 ,
11
12
)
4
3
(
3( 112+x)
2
) 1
2
− 13 x ∈
[
1
12 ,
23
108
)
4
(
1
12 + x
)− 13 x ∈ [0, 112)
0 x < 0
F4(x) =

1 x ≥ 1112(
1
12 + x
) 1
3 x ∈ [ 23108 , 1112)(
3( 112+x)
2
) 1
2
x ∈ [ 112 , 23108)
3
(
1
12 + x
)
x ∈ (0, 112)
1
4 x = 0
0 x < 0
(21)
A graphical illustration of the bidders’ CDFs and PDFs can be found in the
appendix. The expected utility for bidder 1 is 0.027, for expected bid of 0.518;
for bidder 2, 0.041 for expected bid of 0.394; for bidder 3, 0.0625 for expected
bid of 0.277; and for the last bidder, 0.083 for expected bid of 0.207.
A sum-profit auctioneer will see an expected profit of 0.0784, while a max-
profit one will get, in expectation, 0.490.
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As a comparison, in the case where we do not allow failures, the CDF of
the bidders is x
1
3 with expected bid of 14 and expected utility of 0. The expected
profit of the sum-profit auctioneer is 1, while the expected profit of the max-profit
auctioneer is 47 .
5 False Identity and Sabotage
Algorithm 1 Optimal Bid
Input: i, r, p1, . . . , pn and p
′
r
Output: The optimal bid for bidder i
1: let λ =
∏n−1
j=1 (1− pj)
2: for k = 1, . . . ,min {i, r} do
3: if 1n−k ∈ [pk−1, pk] then
4: let xi,k =
(
1− 1n−k
)n−k∏k−1
j=1 (1− pj)− λ
5: let pii,k =
1
n−k
(
1− 1n−k
)n−k−1∏k−1
j=1 (1− pj) pr−p
′
r
pr
+ λ
6: else if 1n−k < pk−1 then
7: let xi,k = sk−1
8: let pii,k = pk−1 (1− pk−1)n−k−1
∏k−1
j=1 (1− pj) pr−p
′
r
pr
+ λ
9: else if 1n−k > pk then
10: let xi,k = sk
11: let pii,k = pk (1− pk)n−k−1
∏k−1
j=1 (1− pj) pr−p
′
r
pr
+ λ
12: end if
13: end for
14: let j ∈ arg maxk pii,k
15: return xi,k
Now, suppose our bidder can influence others’ perceptions, and create a false
sense of its participation probability. What would its best strategy be, and how
should the participation probability be altered? Any bid beyond 1−λ is sure to
win, but as that would give profit of less than λ, which is less than the expected
profit for non-manipulators, it is not worthwhile. Therefore, our bidder will
bid in its support, with the expected profit being λ. However, our bidder may
increase its expected profit by trying to portray its participation probability
as being as low as possible, thus lulling the other bidders with a false sense of
security. Of course, this reduces the payment to auctioneers of any type, and
therefore, they would try to expose such manipulation.
More interesting is the possibility of a player’s changing another player’s
participation probability by using sabotage; thus our bidder would be the only
bidder knowing the real participation probability. Our bidder, i, sabotages
bidder r, with a perceived participation probability of pr, changing its real
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participation probability to p′r. Bidder i’s expected profit with bid x is:
pii(x) = (p
′
rFr(x) + 1− p′r)
n∏
j=1;j 6=i,r
(pjFj(x) + 1− pj) . (22)
The values of this function change according to the relation between r, i and x.
To find the optimal strategy for a bidder, we must examine all the options.
Theorem 7. Let p1, . . . , pn be the announced participation probabilities, and let
p′r < pr be bidder r real participation probability. For every i 6= r, Algorithm 1
finds the optimal bid for bidder i.
To summarize, bidder i best interest is to bid in the intersection of its support
and bidder r’s support. Given the index of the saboteur bidder, the index
of the sabotaged bidder, p1, . . . , pn and the participation probability after the
sabotage, Algorithm 1 finds the optimal bid. The full proof can be found at the
appendix.
6 Uniform Failure Probabilities
If we allow our bidders to have the same probability of failure (e.g., when failures
stem from weather conditions), many of the calculations become more tractable,
and we are able to further understand the scenario.
6.1 Bids
As this case is a particular instance of the general case presented above, we can
calculate the expected equilibrium bid of every bidder and its variance.
Theorem 8. The expected equilibrium bid of every bidder is:
E [bid] =
1
np
(1− λ (1 + p (n− 1))) (23)
and the variance of the bid is:
Var [bid] =
1− (1− p)2n−1
(2n− 1)p −
(1− (1− p)n)2
n2p2
. (24)
The expected bid and the variance are neither monotonic in n nor in p.
6.2 Profits
We are now ready to examine the profits of all the parties, the bidder and the
auctioneer, both in the sum-profit model and the max-profit model.
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6.2.1 Bidder
From the general case we may deduce that expected equilibrium profit of every
bidder is p (1− p)n−1. Note the profit decreases as n increases, and is maximized
when p = 1n . We can now compute the variance of bidder profit.
Theorem 9. The variance of the bidder equilibrium profit is:
Var [BP ] =
n− 1
n (2n− 1) −
(1− p)n
n
+
(
p+
1
2n− 1
)
(1− p)2n−1 . (25)
And the variance is monotonic increasing in p.
6.2.2 Auctioneer - Sum-Profit Model
The expected bid of every bidder is 1pn
(
1− (1− p)n−1 (1 + p (n− 1))
)
, there-
fore, the expected profit of the sum-profit auctioneer, in the equilibrium, is:
E [AP ] = np · E [bid]
= 1− (1− p)n−1 (1 + p (n− 1)) (26)
which increases with p and n. Therefore, the auctioneer best interest is to have
as many bidders as possible. Note that as n grows, the auctioneer’s expected
revenue approaches that of the no-failure case. From Theorem 9 we get the
variance of the auctioneer equilibrium profit in the sum profit model:
Var [AP ] = np2Var [bid]
=
n·p(1−(1−p)2n−1)
2n−1 − (1−(1−p)
n)2
n .
(27)
6.2.3 Auctioneer - Max-Profit Model
For the max-profit auctioneer, the expected profit in equilibrium is:
n
2n− 1 +
n− 1
2n− 1 (1− p)
2n−1 − (1− p)n−1 (28)
which is, monotonically increasing in p and n (for n ≥ 1); for large enough n it
approaches the expected revenue in the no-failure case.
Theorem 10. The variance of the auctioneer equilibrium profit in the max
profit model is:
Var [AP ] = (1− p)2n−2 − 2n(1−p)n−12n−1 + n3n−2 − 2(n−1)
2(1−p)3n−2
(3n−2)(2n−1)
−
(
n
2n−1 +
n−1
2n−1 (1− p)2n−1 − (1− p)n−1
)2
.
(29)
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7 Conclusion and Discussion
Bidders failing to participate in auctions happen commonly, as people choose
to apply to one job but not another, or to participate in the Netflix challenge
but not a similar challenge offered by a competitor. Examining these scenarios
enables us to understand certain fundamental issues in all-pay auctions. In the
complete reliability, classic versions, each bidder has an expected revenue of
0. In contrast, in a limited reliability scenario, such as the one we dealt with,
bidders have positive expected revenue, and are incentivized to participate in
the auction. Auctioneers, on the other hand, mostly lose their strong control of
the auction, and no longer pocket almost all revenues involved in the auction.
However, by influencing participation probabilities, max-profit auctioneers can
effectively increase their revenue in comparison to the no-failure model.
The idea of the equilibrium we explored was that frequent participants could
allow themselves to bid lower, as there would be plenty of contests where they
would be one of the few participants, and hence win with smaller bids. Infre-
quent bidders, on the other hand, would wish to maximize the few times they
participate, and therefore bid fairly high bids. As exists in the no-failure case
as well, as more and more participants join, there is a concentration of bids at
lower price points, as bidders are more afraid of the fierce competition. Hence,
it is fairly easy to see in all of our results that as n approached larger numbers,
the various variables were closer and closer to their no-failure brethren.
There is still much left to explore in these models — not only more techniques
of manipulation by bidders and potential incentives by auctioneers, but also fur-
ther enrichment of the model. Currently, participation rates are not influenced
by other bidders’ probability of participation, but, obviously, many scenarios in
real-life have, effectively, a feedback loop in this regard. We assumed that the
item is commonly valued by all the bidders and the cost of effort is common,
which is not always the case. A future research could examine a more realistic
model with heterogeneous costs or valuations. In our model the failure hap-
pened before the bidder placed their bid, but in other models the failure could
happen after the bidders place their bid and before the auctioneer collected the
bid. Finding a suitable model for such interactions, while an ambitious goal,
might help us gain even further insight into these types of interactions.
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Proof of Theorem 1
Before we prove Theorem 1, we begin with some notations; let 0 < p1 ≤ · · · ≤
pn ≤ 1 be the participation probability of the bidders. we assume that pn−1 < 1,
that is, at most one bidder surely participates in the auction. Let F1, . . . Fn,
be a Nash equilibrium, such that Fi denotes bidder i bid distribution, where
Fi (x) = Pr [bidi ≤ x], note that Fi is a right-continuous function, and Fi has a
left-discontinuous point at x if and only if the bidder has an atomic point at x.
First, we should note that there indeed exists an equilibrium, as the strat-
egy profile F1, . . . , Fn defined in Equations (6) and (7) is an equilibrium (see
Theorem 3).
All the bidders value the item at 1, hence every bidder has no incentive to
bid more than 1, bids less the 0 are ruled out, that is, the bids are drawn from
[0, 1] .
For every i let
αi (x) = Fi (x)− lim
y→x−
Fi (y) , (30)
that is, αi (x) > 0 if and only if bidder i has an atomic point at x.
For every i and x denote by Pr (iwins | x) the probability that bidder i wins
the item, when they might share the item with other bidders,3 if all the other
bidders are bidding according to F−i; and denote by pii (x) the expected profit
of bidder i from bidding x. That is, Pr (iwins | x) = pii (x) + x.
Let si = infx {x ∈ [0, 1] : Fi (x) > Fi (0)} and si = infx {x ∈ [0, 1] : Fi (x) = 1},
the lower and upper bound of player i’s equilibrium bid distribution, excluding
the atomic point at 0 (if exists), respectively. Let pi∗i be player i’s equilibrium
profit, if they have not failed. We said that Fi is strictly increasing at x > 0, if
for every ε > 0: Fi (x) > Fi (x− ε). If Fi is strictly increasing at x, then x is in
bidder i’s support.
The following lemmata characterize any Nash equilibrium, F1, . . . , Fn when
pn−1 < 1, and help us to show that the equilibrium is indeed unique.
Lemma 1. For every i and for every x > 0: αi (x) = 0.
Proof. Falsely assume there is a bidder, say i, with αi (x) > 0 for x > 0. We
shall consider three cases:
• There is other bidder, say j, such that αj (x) > 0. Bidder j can bid
0, with an expected profit of at least 0. Since x > 0, it must hold that
Pr (j wins | x) > 0. In addition, x < 1 as Pr (j wins | x) < 1. Pr (j wins | ·)
has an upward jump at x (since a tie with i is no longer possible), therefore
there is a sufficiently small ε such that Pr (j wins | x+ ε)−Pr (j wins | x) >
ε. Now,
pij(x) = Pr (jwins | x)−x < Pr (j wins | x+ ε)−(x+ ε) = pij(x+ε), (31)
and thus bidder j has an incentive to raise x and place an atom at x+ ε.
3 For example, if when bidding x, bidder i has a probability of p1 to be the only winner
of the item, probability of p2 to share the item with one other bidder and probability of 0 to
share the item with other 2 or more bidders, then Pr (iwins | x) = p1 + 12p2.
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• There is no other bidder with a mass at x, but there is other bidder, say
j, such that x is in bidder j’s support. As Pr (j wins | ·) has an upward
jump at x, it pays for j to transfer mass from an ε-neighborhood below x
to some δ-neighborhood above x.
• There is no other bidder with x in its support, in this case bidder i has
an incentive to reduce x by a sufficiently small ε.
Hence, for every x > 0 there is no bidder with an atomic point at x.
Lemma 2. There is at most one bidder with an atomic point at 0.
Proof. Suppose there are two bidders, i and j, with an atomic point at 0.
Pr (j wins | ·) has an upward jump at 0, therefore, for a sufficiently small ε:
Pr (j wins | ε)− Pr (j wins | 0) > ε, and therefore
pij(0) = Pr (j wins | 0) < Pr (j wins | ε)− ε = pij(ε). (32)
Hence bidder j has an incentive to raise its bid.
The bids are distributed with a non-atomic distribution (except maybe at
0), therefore we do not need to address cases of ties between them, and we have
that for every i and for every x > 0, the following holds:
Pr (iwins | x) =
∏
j 6=i
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj) . (33)
Lemma 3. For x, y > 0 and i, if x and y are in the support of bidders i, then
pii(x) = pii(y).
Proof. Otherwise, assume without loss of generality that pii(x) > pii(y). As
the bids are distributed with a non-atomic distribution, (except maybe one
bidder with an atomic at 0), the utility function pii is continuous in (0, 1). Since
pii(x) > pii(y), it pays for j to transfer mass from an ε-neighborhood around y
to some δ-neighborhood around x.
Lemma 4. For every i and x > 0, if x is in the support of bidder i, then
pii(x) = pi
∗
i . Moreover, if αi(0) > 0, then pii(0) = pi
∗
i
Proof. If bidder i does not have an atomic point at 0 then the claim follows
immediately from Lemma 1 and Lemma 3. If bidder i has an atomic point
at 0 then it is sufficient to show that for some x in the support of bidder i:
pii(0) = pii(x). If pii(0) > pii(x) then it pays for i to transfer mass from an
ε-neighborhood of x to 0; and if pii(0) < pii(x) then it pays for i to transfer mass
from 0 to an ε-neighborhood of x.
Lemma 5. For every i and j, if pi∗i < pi
∗
j then sj > 0.
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Proof. Suppose that pi∗i < pi
∗
j and sj = 0. Note that 0 ≤ pi∗i < pi∗j . If sj = 0
then bidder j has an atomic point at 0 of 1, and pi∗j = pij (0) = Pr (j wins | 0).
Pr (iwins | ·) has an upward jump at 0, therefore for a small ε > 0, bidder i can
bid ε and outbid bidder j, and hence pii (ε) ≥ pi∗j . As pi∗i ≥ pii (ε), we have that
pi∗i ≥ pi∗j in contradiction to the assumption, thus sj > 0.
Lemma 6. For every i and j, pi∗i = pi
∗
j .
Proof. Suppose there exist i and j such that pi∗i 6= pi∗j , and without loss of
generality pi∗i < pi
∗
j . From Lemma 5, it must hold that sj > 0. Since sj > 0
from Lemma 1, the expected profit of bidder j from bidding sj is:
pij (sj) = (piFi (sj) + 1− pi)
∏
k 6=i,j
(pkFk (sj) + 1− pk)− sj . (34)
And from Lemma 4, as sj > 0 and in bidder j’s support, pij (sj) = pi
∗
j . Bidder
i’s expected profit from bidding sj is:
pii (sj) = (pjFj (sj) + 1− pj)
∏
k 6=i,j
(pkFk (sj) + 1− pk)− sj (35)
sj might not be in bidder i’s support, hence pi
∗
i ≥ pii (sj), Fj (sj) = 1 and
Fi (sj) ≤ 1, thus
pi∗i ≥ pii (sj)
= (pjFj (sj) + 1− pj)
∏
k 6=i,j (pkFk (sj) + 1− pk)− sj
=
∏
k 6=i,j (pkFk (sj) + 1− pk)− sj
≥ (piFi (sj) + 1− pi)
∏
k 6=i,j (pkFk (sj) + 1− pk)− sj
= pij (sj)
= pi∗j
(36)
This contradicts the assumption that pi∗i < pi
∗
j , hence for every i and j: pi
∗
i =
pi∗j .
Let λ denote the expected profit of every bidder if have not failed, that is the
expected utility of bidder i is piλ. Bidder n can bid 0, and win the item if all the
other bidders failed to participate in the auction, therefore λ ≥∏n−1i=1 (1− pi) >
0.
Lemma 7. If si < sj for some i 6= j, then pi > pj.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exist i and j such that si < sj but
pi ≤ pj .
• If αi (0) > 0, from Lemma 2 there is no other bidder with α (0) = 0 and
from Lemma 4: λ = pii (0) =
∏
k 6=i (1− pk). Since bidder i has an atomic
point at 0, it holds that
pij (0) =
(
1− pi + 12 (pi · αi (0))
)∏
k 6=i,j (1− pk)
> (1− pi)
∏
k 6=i,j (1− pk)
≥ (1− pj)
∏
k 6=i,j (1− pk)
= λ
(37)
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• If bidder i does not have an atomic point at 0, let x ∈ (si, sj), since x > 0
it holds that
pii (x) = (pjFj (x) + 1− pj)
∏
k 6=i,j (pkFk (x) + 1− pk)− x
= (1− pi)
∏
k 6=i,j (pkFk (x) + 1− pk)− x
= λ
(38)
Bidder j’s expected profit from bidding x is:
pij (x) = (piFi (x) + 1− pi)
∏
k 6=i,j (pkFk (x) + 1− pk)− x
> (1− pi)
∏
k 6=i,j (pkFk (x) + 1− pk)− x
≥ (1− pj)
∏
k 6=i,j
(
pkFk
(
sj
)
d− pk
)− x
= λ
(39)
Where the inequality holds due to the fact that Fi (x) > 0.
That is, in both cases there exists x such that pij (x) > λ, a contradiction to
Lemma 6.
Lemma 8. If pi = pj then si = sj
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 7.
Lemma 9. For every j such that pj = pn, j ∈ arg mini si.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 8 and Lemma 7.
Lemma 10. mini si = 0.
Proof. Otherwise, let j ∈ arg mini si. From Lemma 4 we have that pij
(
sj
)
= pi∗j .
As for every x ∈ (0, sj): Pr (j wins | sj) = Pr (j wins | x), it pays for j to
transfer mass from an ε-neighborhood above sj to an δ-neighborhood below
sj .
Lemma 11. |arg mini si| ≥ 2.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that |arg mini si| = 1, let {j} = arg mini si, and
let k ∈ arg mini 6=j si. From Lemma 10 we have that sj = 0. There exists x > 0
in bidder j’s support such that x < sk. x > 0 and in bidder j’s support thus
pij (x) = λ. Since Pr (j wins | x) = Pr (j wins | y) for y ∈ (0, x), it pays for j to
transfer mass from an ε-neighborhood of x to some δ-neighborhood of y. Hence
we must have that |arg mini si| ≥ 2 and the claim follows.
Lemma 12. If bidder i has an atomic point at 0, then pi = pi+1 = . . . = pn.
Proof. From Lemma 2 there is no other bidder with an atomic point at 0.
Thus, the expected profit of bidder i from bidding 0 is λ =
∏
j 6=i (1− pj), since
λ ≥∏n−1j=1 (1− pj) and pi ≤ pn, it must hold that pi = pn.
Lemma 13. If pi < pj and pj < pn, then si > sj.
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Proof. From Lemma 7 it holds that si ≥ sj . Suppose that si = sj , according to
the assumption pi < pj < pn from Lemma 12 it holds that αi (si) = αj
(
sj
)
= 0.
There exists ε > 0 such that for every x ∈ (si, si + ε): x is in the support of
bidders i and j. The expected profit of both bidders from bidding x ∈ (si, si + ε)
is λ, hence
lim
x→si+
pii (x) = lim
x→si+
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj)
∏
k 6=i,j
(pkFk (x) + 1− pk)−x = λ (40)
and
lim
x→sj+
pij (x) = lim
x→sj+
(piFi (x) + 1− pi)
∏
k 6=i,j
(pkFk (x) + 1− pk)− x = λ (41)
αi (si) = αj
(
sj
)
= 0, hence
limx→s+i pii (x) = (pjFj (si) + 1− pj) limx→s+i
∏
k 6=i,j (pkFk (x) + 1− pk)− limx→s+i x
= (1− pj) limx→s+i
∏
k 6=i,j (pkFk (x) + 1− pk)− si
(42)
and
lim
x→s+j
pij (x) = (1− pi) lim
x→s+j
∏
k 6=i,j
(pkFk (x) + 1− pk)− sj (43)
as pi < pj it holds that λ 6= λ, thus si > sj and the claim follows.
Lemma 14. λ =
∏n−1
j=1 (1− pj).
Proof. From Lemma 7 and Lemma 10 it holds that sn = 0, and from Lemma
12 we can assume without loss of generality that for every i < n, αi(0) = 0.
Hence, we have that
λ = pi∗n = lim
x→0+
pin (x) = lim
x→0+
n−1∏
j=1
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj) =
n−1∏
j=1
(1− pj) . (44)
Lemma 15. There exists i and j such that si = sj = 1− λ.
Proof. Suppose not. Clearly no bidder has an incentive to bid more then 1−λ. If
there is only one bidder with the highest s then they have an incentive to reduce
s. If there are two bidders with the highest s, say i and j, and si = sj < 1− λ,
then it pays for one of them to transfer mass from an ε-neighborhood below x
to some δ-neighborhood above x.
Lemma 16. For x > 0, i and j, if x is in the support of bidders i and j, then
pjFj (x) + 1− pj = piFi (x) + 1− pi .
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Proof. Let x > 0 be in the support of bidders i and j. Since x > 0 From Lemma
1 it holds that no bidder has an atom point at x. x is in bidder i’s support hence,
λ = (pjFj (x) + 1− pj)
∏
k 6=i,j
(pkFk (x) + 1− pk)− x. (45)
x is also in bidder j’s support and therefore,
λ = (piFi (x) + 1− pi)
∏
k 6=i,j
(pkFk (x) + 1− pk)− x (46)
we thus have that
(piFi (x) + 1− pi)
∏
k 6=i,j
(pkFk (x) + 1− pk) = (pjFj (x) + 1− pj)
∏
k 6=i,j
(pkFk (x) + 1− pk) .
(47)
Note that every term in the product is positive as pn−1 < 1 and λ > 0, therefore
pjFj (x) + 1− pj = piFi (x) + 1− pi (48)
and the claim holds.
Lemma 17. If Fi is strictly increasing on some open interval (a, b), where
0 ≤ a < b < 1− λ, then Fi is strictly increasing on the interval (a, 1− λ].
Proof. Suppose not, then without loss of generality, assume that Fi is constant
over the interval (b, c) for some c ∈ (b, 1− λ]. There must be some ε > 0 such
that there is at least one bidder, say j, with Fj strictly increasing on (b, b+ ε).
(Otherwise, it pays to some other player to place an atom at b.) From Lemma 4
pii (b) = λ and from Lemma 16, piFi (b) + 1 − pi = pjFj (b) + 1 − pj . Let
x ∈ (b, b+ ε), x is not in bidder i’s support hence pii (x) ≤ pii (b) = λ, x is in
bidder j’s support hence pij (x) = λ. Fj is strictly increasing on (b, b+ ε) hence
Fj (x) > Fj (b), Fi is constant on (b, b+ ε) hence Fi (b) = Fi (x). Add it all
together:
pii (x) ≤ pij (x) ⇐⇒∏
k 6=i (pkFk (x) + 1− pk)− x ≤
∏
k 6=j (pkFk (x) + 1− pk)− x ⇐⇒
pjFj (x) + 1− pj ≤ piFi (x) + 1− pi ⇐⇒
pjFj (x) + 1− pj ≤ piFi (b) + 1− pi ⇐⇒
pjFj (x) + 1− pj ≤ pjFj (b) + 1− pj ⇐⇒
Fj (x) ≤ Fj (b) .
(49)
A contradiction to the fact that Fj (x) > Fj (b). Hence, the claim holds.
Lemma 18. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, si = 1− λ.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 17, we have that si ∈ {0, 1− λ}. If si = 0, it
means that pi = pn, bidder i has an atomic point at 0 of 1 and λ =
∏
k 6=i (i− pk).
Now, limx→0+ pij(x) =
∏
k 6=i,j (1− pk) > λ and therefore it pays for j to transfer
mass to a δ-neighborhood above 0. Hence, for every i: si = 1− λ.
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Lemma 19. If x > 0 is in bidder i’s support, then there must be j 6= i such
that x is in bidder j’s support.
Proof. Let x > 0 be in bidder i’s support. If for every y ∈ (0, x) and for every
j 6= i: y is not in bidder j’s support, then it pays for i to transfer mass from
an ε-neighborhood above x to a δ-neighborhood below x. Hence, there must
exists j 6= i and y ∈ (0, x) such that y is in bidder j’s support, from Lemma
1 αj (y) = 0, hence there is a neighborhood below y such that Fj is strictly
increasing in that neighborhood. From Lemma 17, (y, 1− λ] is in bidder j’s
support. x is in bidder i’s support so x ≤ 1−λ, hence x is in bidder j’s support
and the claim follows.
Lemma 20. There are at least two bidders with strictly increasing CDFs on
(0, 1− λ].
Proof. From Lemmata 11 and 2, there is j ∈ arg mini si with αj (0) = 0, from
Lemma 17 Fj is strictly increasing on (0, 1− λ], from Lemma 19 there is another
bidder with is strictly increasing CDF on (0, 1− λ].
Lemma 21. There exists a continuous function z : (0, 1− λ]→ [0, 1] such that
if x is in bidder i’s support then Fi (x) =
z(x)+pi−1
pi
.
Proof. From Lemma 20 there is j, such that Fj is strictly increasing on (0, 1− λ].
Let us define for every x ∈ (0, 1− λ]: z (x) := pjFj (x) + 1− pj . For every i and
x in bidder i’s support, from Lemma 16 it holds that Fi (x) =
z(x)+pi−1
pi
and
the claim holds.
Lemma 22. If pn = pn−1 < 1 and Fi is strictly increasing on the interval
(0, 1− λ] then pi = pn.
Proof. Since there are at least two bidders with p = pn, and from Lemma 16 it
holds that for every j if pj = pn then Fj = Fn; we may conclude that there is no
bidder with an atomic point at 0. That is, limx→0+ Fn (x) = Fn (0) = 0. Fi is
strictly increasing on (0, 1− λ], and Fi (0) = 0 hence limx→0+ Fi (x) = Fi (0) =
0. From Lemma 16 it holds that:
pj limx→0+ Fj (x) + 1− pj = pi limx→0+ Fi (x) + 1− pi ⇐⇒
pjFj (0) + 1− pj = piFi (0) + 1− pi ⇐⇒
1− pj = 1− pi ⇐⇒
pi = pj
(50)
and the claim follows.
Lemma 23. If pn 6= pn−1 < 1 bidder n has an atomic point in the distribution
at 0 of 1− pn−1pn .
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Proof. From Lemma 13, Lemma 11 and Lemma 10, sn = sn−1 = 0. From
Lemma 18 and Lemma 17 Fn and Fn−1 are strictly increasing on (0, 1− λ].
From Lemma 16 for every x ∈ (0, 1− λ] it holds that
pnFn (x) + 1− pn = pn−1Fn−1 (x) + 1− pn−1, (51)
and from Lemma 12 Fn−1(0) = 0. That is,
limx→0+ pnFn (x) + 1− pn = limx→0+ pn−1Fn−1 (x) + 1− pn−1 ⇐⇒
pnFn (0) + 1− pn = pn−1Fn−1 (0) + 1− pn−1 ⇐⇒
pnαn (0) + 1− pn = 1− pn−1.
(52)
Hence αn (0) = 1− pn−1pn .
We are now, finally, ready to prove Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. In common values all-pay auction when the item value is 1, if
pn−1 < 1 then there is a unique Nash equilibrium, in which the expected profit
of every participating bidder is
∏n−1
j=1 (1− pj). Furthermore, there exists a con-
tinuous function z :
[
0, 1−∏n−1j=1 (1− pj)] → [0, 1], such that when a bidder i,
has a positive density over an interval, they bid according to Fi (x) =
z(x)+pi−1
pi
over that interval, and if pi = pj then Fi = Fj.
Proof. Let 0 < p1 ≤ · · · ≤ pn, such that pn−1 < 1. From Lemma 6 and
Lemma 14 we have that in any Nash equilibrium the expected profit of every
participating bidder is λ =
∏n−1
j=1 (1− pj), from Lemma 18 we have that for
every i: si = 1−λ, and from Lemma 7 we have that 1−λ ≥ s1 ≥ · · · ≥ sn = 0.
There are two possible cases, either pn = pn−1 or pn > pn−1;
• If pn = pn−1, let mn be the minimal index such that pmn = pn. Since
pn = pn−1 there is no bidder with an atomic point at 0. From Lemma 22
it holds that smn−1 > smn = 0, adding it with Lemmas 13 and Lemma 7
we have that pi < pj ⇐⇒ si > sj .
For every i: Fi is strictly increasing in (s1, 1− λ], since the expected profit
of each participating bidder is λ, we have that for every x ∈ (s1, 1− λ]
λ = pii (x) =
∏
j 6=1 (1− pj + pjFj (x))− x
=
∏
j 6=1
(
1− pj + pj z(x)+pj−1pj
)
− x
= z (x)
n−1 − x.
(53)
Therefore for every x ∈ (s1, 1− λ] and for every i: z (x) = (x+ λ)
1
n−1 and
Fi (x) =
(x+λ)
1
n−1 +pi−1
pi
. Since there is no bidder with an atomic point at
0, it holds that F1 (s1) = 0, hence it follows that s1 = (1− p1)n−1 − λ.
Let m2 be the minimal index such that pm2 > p1. From Lemma 8 we have
that for every j < m2 it holds that sj = s1 and sm2 < s1.
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For every i < m2 and for every x ≤ s1, Fi (x) = 0; for every i ≥ m2 and
for every x ∈ (sm2 , s1], Fi (x) > 0 and pii (x) = λ.
λ = pii (x) =
∏
j 6=1 (1− pj + pjFj (x))− x
=
∏
j<k2
(1− pj + pjFj (x))
∏
j ≥ m2
j 6= i
(1− pj + pjFj (x))− x
=
∏
j<m2
(1− pj)
∏
j ≥ m2
j 6= i
(
1− pj + pj z(x)+pj−1pj
)
− x
= (1− pj)m2−1 z (x)n−m2 − x,
(54)
Therefore for every x ∈ (sm2 , s1] and for every i ≥ m2: z (x) = ( x+λ(1−pj)m2−1) 1n−m2
and Fi (x) =
(
x+λ
(1−pj)m2−1
) 1
n−m2
+1−pi
pi
. Fm2
(
sm2
)
= 0, hence it follows
that sm2 = (1− pm2)n−m2 (1− p1)m2−1 − λ.
In the general case, let k be an index such that sk−1 > sk, that is pk−1 <
pk. Since for every i < k and for every x ∈
(
sk, sk−1
]
: Fj (x) = 0; for
every i ≥ k and for every x ∈ (sk, sk−1]: Fi (x) > 0 and pii(x) = λ.
λ = pii (x) =
∏
j 6=1 (1− pj + pjFj (x))− x
=
∏
j<k (1− pj + pjFj (x))
∏
j ≥ k
j 6= i
(1− pj + pjFj (x))− x
=
∏
j<k (1− pj)
∏
j ≥ k
j 6= i
(
1− pj + pj z(x)+pj−1pj
)
− x
=
∏k−1
j=1 (1− pj) z (x)n−k − x.
(55)
Therefore for every x ∈ (sk, sk−1] and for every i ≥ k: z (x) = ( x+λ∏k−1
j=1 (1−pj)
) 1
n−k
and Fi (x) =
(
x+λ∏k−1
j=1 (1−pj)
) 1
n−k
+1−pi
pi
. Fk (sk) = 0, hence it follows that
sk = (1− pk)n−k
∏k−1
j=1 (1− pj)− λ.
We can continue in the same way, until the interval
(
0, smn
]
, in which for
every i < mn and for every x ∈
(
0, smn
]
: Fj (x) = 0; and for every i ≥ mn
and for every x ∈ (0, smn]: Fj (x) > 0. Therefore for every i ≥ mn and
for every x ∈ (0, smn]: Fi (x) =
(
(x+λ)∏mn−1
j=1 (1−pj)
) 1
n−mn
+pi−1
pi
.
Thus, for every i: Fi is uniquely determined, and therefore the equilibrium
is unique.
• If pn > pn, similarly to the previous case, for every i: Fi is uniquely
determined. The only exceptions are that sn = sn−1, and bidder n has an
atomic point at 0, of 1− pn−1pn .
Hence, for 0 < p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn−1 ≤ pn, where pn−1 < 1, and either
pn = pn−1 or pn > pn−1, in the unique equilibrium, s1 = (1− p1)n−1 − λ,
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sk = (1− pk)n−k
∏k−1
j=1 (1− pj) − λ for k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, and sn = sn−1 = 0,
where λ =
∏n−1
j=1 (1− pj). For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 the CDFs are:
Fi (x) =

1 x ≥ 1− λ
z(x)+pi−1
pi
x ∈ [s1, 1− λ)
...
...
z(x)+pi−1
pi
x ∈ [sk, sk−1)
...
...
z(x)+pi−1
pi
x ∈ [si, si−1)
0 x < si
(56)
and Fn =
pn−1
pn
Fn−1, where
z (x) =

(λ+ x)
1
n−1 x ∈ [s1, 1− λ)
...
...(
λ+x∏k−1
j=1 (1−pj)
) 1
n−k
x ∈ [sk, sk−1)
...
...
λ+x∏n−2
j=1 (1−pj)
x ∈ [0, sn−2) .
(57)
Proof of Theorem 2
When there are at least two bidders with p = 1, the auction approaches the
case without failures. If we do not allow agent failures, Baye et al. [1996]
characterized the equilibria.
Theorem 11 (Baye et al. [1996]). The first price sealed bid all pay common
values auction with complete information possesses two types of equilibria. Ei-
ther all players use the same continuous mixed strategy with support [0, 1], or
at least two bidders randomize continuously over [0, 1] with each other player i
randomizing continuously over (bi, 1], bi > 0, and having an atomic at 0 equals
to Gi (bi). When two or more bidders have a positive density over a common
interval they play the same continuous mixed strategy over that interval. Fur-
thermore, if bidders m+1, . . . , n randomized continuously over [0, 1], with bidder
i = 1, . . . ,m randomized continuously over (bi, 1], with 1 ≥ b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bm. The
equilibrium strategies are:
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Gi (x) =

x
1
n−1 x ∈ [b1, 1](
x
G1(b1)
) 1
n−2
x ∈ [b2, b1)
...
...(
x∏
j<k Gj(bj)
) 1
k−1
x ∈ [bk, bk−1)
...
...(
x∏
j<iGj(bj)
) 1
i−1
x ∈ [bi, bi−1)
Gi (bi) x ∈ [0, bi)
0 x < 0
(58)
In the Nash equilibrium strategies presented in Baye et al. [1996], the bi’s
fully defines the atomic point of bidder i at 0, and vice versa.4 That is, every
Nash equilibrium is defined by the bidders’ atomic points at 0, and when the
bidders’ atomic points at 0 are set, the Nash equilibrium is unique. The expected
profit of every bidder in any Nash equilibrium is 0.
Theorem 2. In common values all-pay auction when the item value is 1, if
pn−1 = 1 then in every Nash equilibrium the expected profit of every participating
bidder is 0. At least two bidders with p = 1 randomize over [0, 1] with each other
player i randomizing continuously over (bi, 1], bi > 0, and having an atomic
point at 0 of αi (0). There exists a continuous function z (x) : [0, 1] → [0, 1],
such that when a bidder, i, has a positive density over an interval, they bid
according to Fi (x) =
z(x)+pi−1
pi
over that interval. For every i — the atomic
point at 0 is equals to Fi (0).
Proof. Let 0 < p1 ≤ . . . pn−2 ≤ pn−1 = pn = 1, let F1, . . . Fn, be a Nash
equilibrium, and let αi (0) be bidder i’s atomic point at 0, that is αi (0) = Fi (0).
We first note that there must be a bidder with p = 1 and αi (0) = 0, otherwise
any other bidder with p = 1 has an incentive to bid a small ε and win the item
with a positive probability. Hence, failing to participate in the auction and
biding 0, would lead to the same result — 0 probability of winning the item.
If a bidder has a participating probability of p, and an atomic point at 0
of α (0), it can be considered as the bidder has a participating probability of
1, and an atomic point at 0 of 1 − p (1− α (0)). The probability to outbid
bidder i when bidding x, is the probability that either bidder i had failed or
bidder i hadn’t failed and bid less then x. That is, the probability of outbidding
bidder i is 1 − pi + piFi (x), hence if we let βi (0) = 1 − pi (1− αi (0)) and
4We can set the atomic point of bidder 1 at 0, α1(0), to b
1
n−1
1 , and α2 (0) =(
b2
α1(0)
) 1
n−2
,...,αm (0) =
(
bm∏
j<m αj(0)
)
. In the other direction, once we set αi (0), we
can set b1 = α1 (0)
n−1, b2 = α1 (0)α2 (0)n−2,...,bm (0) =
∏
j<m αj (0)αm (0)
n−m.
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Gi (x) = 1 − pi + piFi (x), then the Gis are equilibrium distributions of the
auction without agent failures, in which bidder i has an atomic point at 0 of
βi (0), and the expected profit of each bidder is 0.
From Theorem 11, at least two bidders randomized continuously over [0, 1]
with no atomic point at 0, that is, for at least two bidders βi (0) = 0, hence it
must hold that for at least two bidders, say n and n− 1, with p = 1, α (0) = 0.
By letting z (x) = Gn (x) the theorem is proved.
Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1:
E [bidi] =
1
pi
(
1
n
+
i∑
k=1
(1− pk)n−k
∏k
j=1 (1− pj)
(n− k) (n− k + 1) −
− (1− pi)
n−i∏i
j=1 (1− pj)
n− i − piλ
) (59)
and
E [bidn] =
pn−1
pn
E [bidn−1] . (60)
Proof. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 we have that
E [bidi] =
i∑
k=1
sk−1∫
sk
xfi (x) dx. (61)
Fix k ∈ {1, . . . , i}
sk−1∫
sk
xfi (x) dx =
1
pi
1
n−k
k−1∏
j=0
(1− pj)
−1
n−k
∫ sk−1
sk
x (λ+ x)
1−n+k
n−k dx
= 1pi
k−1∏
j=0
(1− pj)
−1
n−k (λ+ x)
1
n−k
(
λ+x
n−k+1 − λ
)∣∣∣∣∣
sk−1
sk
(62)
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= 1pi
(
k−1∏
j=0
(1− pj)
−1
n−k
(
λ+ sk−1
) 1
n−k
(
λ+sk
n−k+1 − λ
)
−
k−1∏
j=0
(1− pj)
−1
n−k (λ+ sk)
1
n−k
(
λ+sk−1
n−k+1 − λ
))
= 1pi
k−1∏
j=0
(1−pj)
−1
n−k
(
(1−pk−1)n−k
k−1∏
j=0
(1−pj)
) 1
n−k
 (1−pk−1)
n−k k−1∏
j=0
(1−pj)
n−k+1 −λ

−
k−1∏
j=0
(1−pj)
−1
n−k
(
(1−pk)n−k
k−1∏
j=0
(1−pj)
) 1
n−k
 (1−pk)
n−k k−1∏
j=0
(1−pj)
n−k+1 −λ


= 1pi
(1−pk−1)
 (1−pk−1)
n−k k−1∏
j=0
(1−pj)
n−k+1 −λ
−(1−pk)
 (1−pk)
n−k k−1∏
j=0
(1−pj)
n−k+1 −λ

.
(63)
Hence, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
E [bidi] =
i∑
k=1
sk−1∫
sk
xfi (x) dx
= 1pi
(
i−1∑
k=0
(1− pk)
(
(1−pk)n−k−1
∏k
j=0(1−pj)
n−k − λ
)
−
i∑
k=1
(1− pk)
(
(1−pk)n−k
∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
n−k+1 − λ
))
= 1pi
(
1
n − λ+
i∑
k=1
(1−pk)n−k
∏k
j=0(1−pj)
(n−k)(n−k+1)
− (1− pi)
(
(1−pi)n−i
∏i−1
j=0(1−pj)
n−i − λ
))
= 1pi
(
1
n +
i∑
k=1
(1−pk)n−k
∏k
j=1(1−pj)
(n−k)(n−k+1) −
(1−pi)n−i
∏i
j=1(1−pj)
n−i − piλ
)
.
(64)
As fn (x) =
pn−1
pn
fn−1 (x) it holds that E [bidn] = pn−1pn E [bidn−1].
Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. The sum-profit auctioneer’s profits are:
n∑
i=1
piE [bidi] = 1− λ
(
1 +
n−1∑
i=1
pi
)
Proof. The sum-profit auctioneer collects all the bids of the bidders that have
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not failed. Therefore:
E [AP ] =
n∑
i=1
piE [bidi]
=
n−1∑
i=1
piE [bidi] + pnE [bidn]
=
n−1∑
i=1
(
1
n +
i∑
k=1
(1−pk)n−k
∏k
j=1(1−pj)
(n−k)(n−k+1) −
(1−pi)n−i
∏i
j=1(1−pj)
n−i − piλ
)
+ 1n +
n−1∑
k=1
(1−pk)n−k
∏k
j=1(1−pj)
(n−k)(n−k+1) − λ
= 1 +
n−1∑
k=1
(1−pk)n−k
∏k
j=0(1−pj)
n−k −
n−1∑
i=1
(1−pi)n−i
∏i
j=0(1−pj)
n−i
−λ−
n−1∑
i=1
piλ
= 1− λ
(
1 +
n−1∑
i=1
pi
)
.
(65)
Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6. The max-profit auctioneer’s profits are:
E [AP ] =
s0∫
sn−1
xg (x) dx
=
n
2n− 1 − λ+
n−1∑
k=1
(
(1− pk)2n−2k−1
∏k
j=1(1− pj)2
4(n− k)2 − 1
)
Proof. Looking for the expected profit, we have:
s0∫
sn−1
xg (x) dx =
n−1∑
k=1
∫ sk−1
sk
xn−k+1n−k
(
λ+x∏k−1
j=0 (1−p1)
) 1
n−k
dx
=
n−1∑
k=1
(
k−1∏
j=0
(1−pj)
−1
n−k (λ+x)
n−k+1
n−k ((λ+x) n−k+12n−2k+1−λ)
)∣∣∣∣∣
sk−1
sk
=
n−1∑
k=1
(
k−1∏
j=0
(1−pj)(1−pk−1)n−k+1
(
k−1∏
j=0
(1−pj)(1−pk−1)n−k n−k+12n−2k+1−λ
)
−
k−1∏
j=0
(1−pj)(1−pk)n−k+1
(
k−1∏
j=0
(1−pj)(1−pk)n−k n−k+12n−2k+1−λ
))
= +
n−2∑
k=0
(
k∏
j=0
(1−pj)(1−pk)n−k
(
k∏
j=0
(1−pj)(1−pk)n−k−1 n−k2n−2k−1−λ
))
−
n−1∑
k=1
(
k∏
j=0
(1−pj)(1−pk)n−k
(
k∏
j=0
(1−pj)(1−pk)n−k−1 n−k+12n−2k+1−λ
))
= n2n−1 − λ+
n−1∑
k=1
(1−pk)2n−2k−1
∏k
j=1(1−pj)2
4(n−k)2−1 .
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Example 1
Example 1. Consider how four bidders interact. Our bidders have participation
probability of p1 =
1
3 , p2 =
1
2 , p3 =
3
4 and p4 = 1. Let us look at each bidder’s
CDFs:
F1(x) =

1 x ≥ 1112
3
(
1
12 + x
) 1
3 − 2 x ∈ [ 23108 , 1112)
0 x < 23108
F2(x) =

1 x ≥ 1112
2
(
1
12 + x
) 1
3 − 1 x ∈ [ 23108 , 1112)
2
(
3( 112+x)
2
) 1
2
− 1 x ∈ [ 112 , 23108)
0 x < 112
F3(x) =

1 x ≥ 1112
4
3
(
1
12 + x
) 1
3 − 13 x ∈
[
23
108 ,
11
12
)
4
3
(
3( 112+x)
2
) 1
2
− 13 x ∈
[
1
12 ,
23
108
)
4
(
1
12 + x
)− 13 x ∈ [0, 112)
0 x < 0
F4(x) =

1 x ≥ 1112(
1
12 + x
) 1
3 x ∈ [ 23108 , 1112)(
3( 112+x)
2
) 1
2
x ∈ [ 112 , 23108)
3
(
1
12 + x
)
x ∈ (0, 112)
1
4 x = 0
0 x < 0
A graphical illustration of the bidders’ CDFs (1a) and PDFs (1b) can be
found in figure 1.
Proof of Theorem 7
Let p1, . . . , pn be the announced participation probabilities, and let p
′
r < pr be
bidder r real participation probability. For every i 6= r, bidder i’s expected
profit from bid x is:
pii(x) = (p
′
rFr(x) + 1− p′r)
n∏
j=1;j 6=i,r
(pjFj(x) + 1− pj) .
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Figure 1: The CDFs (a) and the PDFs (b) when p1 =
1
3 , p2 =
1
2 , p3 =
3
4 and
p4 = 1
The values of this function change according to the relation between r, i and x.
The following lemmata offer some insights regarding the optimal strategy for a
bidder.
Lemma 24. Let p1, . . . , pn be the announced participation probabilities, and let
p′r < pr be bidder r real participation probability. For every i > r, the expected
profit of bidder i from bidding x ∈ [sk, sk−1), for k ≤ i and k > r, is:
pii(x) =
1− p′r
1− pr (λ+ x)− x =
pr − p′r
1− pr (λ+ x) + λ.
Proof. The expected profit of bidder i from bidding x ∈ [sk, sk−1), for k ≤ i
and k > r, is:
pii (x) =
n∏
j=1;j 6=i,r
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj) (p′rFr (x) + 1− p′r)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1;j 6=r
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj)
n∏
j=1;j 6=i
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj) (p′rFr (x) + 1− p′r)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1;j 6=r
(1− pj)
n∏
j=1;j 6=i
(Hk (x)) (1− p′r)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1;j 6=r
(1− pj)Hk (x)n−k (1− p′r)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1;j 6=r
(1− pj)
(
λ+x∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
)
(1− p′r)− x
=
1−p′r
1−pr (λ+ x)− x
=
(
pr−p′r
1−pr
)
(λ+ x) + λ.
(66)
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In this case, this is larger than λ, and grows with the bid, though the maximal
bid (due to the fact that k > r) is sr.
When either i < r or i > r, bidder can bid in the support of both bidders.
Lemma 25. Let p1, . . . , pn be the announced participation probabilities, and let
p′r be bidder r real participation probability. For every i 6= r, the expected profit
of bidder i from bidding x ∈ [sk, sk−1), such that k ≤ min{i, r} is:
pii(x) =
pr − p′r
pr
(λ+ x)
(∏k−1j=1 (1− pj)
λ+ x
) 1
n−k
− 1
+ λ.
Proof. The expected profit of bidder i from bidding x ∈ [sk, sk−1), such that
k ≤ min{i, r} is:
pii (x) =
n∏
j=1;j 6=i,r
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj) (p′rFr (x) + 1− p′r)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj)
n∏
j=k;j 6=i,r
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj) (p′rFr (x) + 1− p′r)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj)
n∏
j=k;j 6=i,r
(Hk (x)) (p
′
rFr (x) + 1− p′r)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj)Hk (x)n−k−1
(
p′r
Hk(x)+pr−1
pr
+ 1− p′r
)
− x
=
k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj)Hk (x)n−k−1
(
p′r
pr
Hk (x) +
pr−p′r
pr
)
− x
=
k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj)Hk (x)n−k p
′
r
pr
+
k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj)Hk (x)n−k−1 pr−p
′
r
pr
− x
=
k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj)
(
λ+x∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
)
p′r
pr
+
k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj)Hk (x)n−k−1 pr−p
′
r
pr
− x
=
p′r
pr
(λ+ x) +
k−1∏
j = 1
(1− pj)
(
λ+x∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
)n−k−1
n−k
pr−p′r
pr
− x
=
p′r
pr
(λ+ x) +
k−1∏
j = 1
(1− pj)
1
n−k (λ+ x)
n−k−1
n−k pr−p′r
pr
− x
= (λ+ x)
(
p′r
pr
+
pr−p′r
pr
(
λ+x∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
) −1
n−k
)
− x
= (λ+ x)
pr−p′r
pr
((
λ+x∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
) −1
n−k
− 1
)
+ λ.
(67)
Since x < sk−1, this means that λ+x < (1− pk−1)n−k
∏k−1
j=0 (1− pj), hence
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(
λ+x∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
) −1
n−k
> 1; again, this is an increase over λ, the position without
sabotaging.
Lemma 26. Let p1, . . . , pn be the announced participation probabilities, and let
p′r < pr be bidder r real participation probability. For every i 6= r and for every
x ∈ [0, si), there exists x′ ∈ [si, 1− λ], such that pii (x) ≤ pii (x′).
Proof. When i < r, bidder i can bid in bidder r’s support and not in its own
support, i.e., bidder i can bid x ∈ [sk, sk−1) for k ≤ r and i < k. We first note
that bidder i can bid si in its support with expected utility of:
pii (si) = (1− pi)n−i−1
i−1∏
j=0
(1− pj) pr − p
′
r
pr
pi + λ. (68)
When x is in bidder r’s support and not in bidder i’s support:
pii (x) =
n∏
j=1;j 6=i,r
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj) (p′rFr (x) + 1− p′r)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1;j 6=i
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj)
n∏
j=k;j 6=r
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj) (p′rFr (x) + 1− p′r)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1;j 6=i
(1− pj)
n∏
j=k;j 6=r
(Hk (x))
(
p′r
pr
(Hk (x)− 1) + 1
)
− x
=
∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
1−pi Hk (x)
n−k
(
p′r
pr
(Hk (x)− 1) + 1
)
− x
= λ+x1−pi
(
p′r
pr
(
λ+x∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
) 1
n−k
− p′rpr + 1
)
− x
= λ+x1−pi
(
p′r
pr
(
λ+x∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
) 1
n−k
− p′rpr + pi
)
+ λ.
(69)
If pi ≥ p
′
r
pr
then pii (x) monotonic grows with x, and maximized when x = si;
While if pi <
p′r
pr
, differentiating pii (x) twice with respect to x gives:
∂2
∂x2
pii (x) =
p′r
pr
1
1− pi
(
1 +
1
n− k
)(
1
n− k
)(
λ+ x∏k−1
j=0 (1− pj)
) 1
n−k−1 k−1∏
j=0
(1− pj)
−1
n−k ,
(70)
that is, for every x ∈ [sk, sk−1): ∂2∂x2pii (x) ≥ 0, hence, the extremum is a
minimum point and the utility maximized when either x = sk−1 or x = sk.
When bidding sk the expected utility is:
pii (sk) =
∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)(1−pk)n−k
1−pi
(
p′r
pr
(1− pk)− p
′
r
pr
+ pi
)
+ λ
=
∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)(1−pk)n−k
1−pi
(
pi − p
′
r
pr
pk
)
+ λ.
(71)
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If pi − p
′
r
pr
pk < 0 then pii (sk) < λ ≤ pii (si).
Otherwise, if pi − p
′
r
pr
pk ≥ 0, since i < k it holds that pi ≤ pk, and therefore∏k−1
j=0 (1− pj) (1− pk)n−k ≤
∏i−1
j=0 (1− pj) (1− pi)n−i and
pii (sk) ≤
∏i−1
j=0(1−pj)(1−pi)n−i
1−pi
(
pi − p
′
r
pr
pk
)
+ λ
=
∏i−1
j=0 (1− pj) (1− pi)n−i−1
(
pi − p
′
r
pr
pk
)
+ λ
≤ ∏i−1j=0 (1− pj) (1− pi)n−i−1 (pi − p′rpr pi)+ λ
=
∏i−1
j=0 (1− pj) (1− pi)n−i−1 pr−p
′
r
pr
pi + λ
= pii (si) .
(72)
Similarly, pii
(
sk−1
) ≤ pii (si). That is, for every x ∈ [sk, sk−1): pii (x) ≤
pii (si). Therefore, bidder i has no incentive to bid outside of its support and in
bidder r’s support.
When x is outside of the support of both bidders, i.e. x ∈ [sk, sk−1) for
k > i and k > r:
pii (x) =
n∏
j=1;j 6=i,r
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj) (p′rFr (x) + 1− p′r)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1;j 6=i,r
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj)
n∏
j=k
(pjFj (x) + 1− pj) (p′rFr (x) + 1− p′r)− x
=
k−1∏
j=1;j 6=i,r
(1− pj)
n∏
j=k
(Hk (x)) (1− p′r)− x
=
∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
1−pi Hk (x)
n−k+1 1−p′r
1−pr − x
=
∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
1−pi
1−p′r
1−pr
(
λ+x∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
)n−k+1
n−k
− x
=
∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
−1
n−k
1−pi
1−p′r
1−pr (λ+ x)
n−k+1
n−k − x
= (λ+ x)
(
1−p′r
(1−pi)(1−pr)
(
λ+x∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
) 1
n−k
− 1
)
+ λ.
(73)
Differentiating the above twice with respect to x gives:
∂2
∂x2
pii (x) =
1− p′r
(1− pi) (1− pr)
(
1− 1
n− k
)
1
n− k
(
λ+ x∏k−1
j=0 (1− pj)
) 1
n−k−1 k−1∏
j=0
(1− pj)
−1
n−k .
(74)
Again, for every x ∈ [sk, sk−1): ∂2∂x2pii (x) ≥ 0, hence, the extremum is a mini-
mum point and the utility maximized when either x = sk−1 or x = sk.
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When bidding sk the expected utility is:
pii (sk) = (1− pk)n−k
(
1−p′r
(1−pi)(1−pr)
(
(1−pk)n−k
∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)∏k−1
j=0 (1−pj)
) 1
n−k
− 1
)∏k−1
j=0 (1− pj) + λ
= (1− pk)n−k
(
1−p′r
(1−pi)(1−pr) (1− pk)− 1
)∏k−1
j=0 (1− pj) + λ.
(75)
If
1−p′r
(1−pi)(1−pr) (1− pk)− 1 ≤ 0, then pii (sk) ≤ λ ≤ pii (sr).
Otherwise,
1−p′r
(1−pi)(1−pr) (1− pk) − 1 > 0. In this case we separate the two
sub-cases; if r < i, the expected utility for bidder i from bidding sr in its support
is:
pii (sr) = (pr − p′r) (1− pr)n−r−1
r−1∏
j=0
(1− pj) + λ (76)
since k > i we have that 1−pk1−pi ≤ 1 and since k > r we have that∏k−1
j=0 (1− pj) (1− pk)n−k ≤
∏r−1
j=0 (1− pj) (1− pr)n−r, hence–
pii (sk) =
(
1−p′r
(1−pi)(1−pr) (1− pk)− 1
)
(1− pk)n−k
∏k−1
j=0 (1− pj) + λ
≤
(
1−p′r
1−pr − 1
)
(1− pk)n−k
∏k−1
j=0 (1− pj) + λ
≤
(
1−p′r
1−pr − 1
)
(1− pk)n−r
∏r−1
j=0 (1− pj) + λ
≤
(
1−p′r
1−pr − 1
)
(1− pr)n−r
∏r−1
j=0 (1− pj) + λ
=
pr−p′r
1−pr (1− pr)
n−r∏r−1
j=0 (1− pj) + λ
= (pr − p′r) (1− pr)n−r−1
∏r−1
j=0 (1− pj) + λ
= pii (sr) .
(77)
Similarly pii
(
sk−1
) ≤ pii (sr), that is, for every x ∈ [sk, sk−1): pii (x) ≤ pii (sr).
And in a similar way if r > i, for every k > r, it holds that both pii (sk) ≤
pii (si) and pii
(
sk−1
) ≤ pii (si), thus for every x ∈ [sk, sk−1): pii (x) ≤ pii (si).
Therefore, even if bidder i sabotaged bidder r, bidder i has no incentive to
deviate from its support.
Armed with Lemmata 24, 25 and 26 we may proceed to prove Theorem 7.
Theorem 7. Let p1, . . . , pn be the announced participation probabilities, and let
p′r < pr be bidder r real participation probability. For every i 6= r, Algorithm 1
finds the optimal bid for bidder i.
Proof. Lemmata 24, 25 and 26 tell us that the optimal bid is in
[
smin{i,r}, s0
]
.
Now, in order find the optimal bid in
[
sk, sk−1
]
for k ≤ min{i, r}, we differ-
entiate pii with respect to x:
∂
∂x
pii (x) =
pr − p′r
pr
(
1− 1
n− k
)(
λ+ x∏k−1
j=1 (1− pj)
) −1
n−k
− pr − p
′
r
pr
. (78)
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That is, pii (x) maximized when
x =
(
1− 1
n− k
)n−k k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj)− λ. (79)
Now, x ∈ [sk, sk−1], and it holds that(
1− 1n−k
)n−k∏k−1
j=1 (1− pj)− λ ∈
[
sk, sk−1
] ⇐⇒
1
n−k ∈ [pk−1, pk] .
(80)
Thus, the optimal bid for bidder i in
[
sk, sk−1
]
, depends if either 1n−k ∈
[pk−1, pk], 1n−k < pk−1 or
1
n−k > pk.
• If 1n−k ∈ [pk−1, pk] then the optimal bid in
[
sk, sk−1
]
is
x =
(
1− 1
n− k
)n−k k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj)− λ
and the expected profit is:
1
n− k
(
1− 1
n− k
)n−k−1 k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj) pr − p
′
r
pr
+ λ. (81)
• If 1n−k < pk−1 then the optimal bid in
[
sk, sk−1
]
is x = sk−1 and the
expected profit is:
pk−1 (1− pk−1)n−k−1
k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj) pr − p
′
r
pr
+ λ. (82)
• If 1n−k > pk then the optimal bid in
[
sk, sk−1
]
is x = sk and the expected
profit is:
pk (1− pk)n−k−1
k−1∏
j=1
(1− pj) pr − p
′
r
pr
+ λ. (83)
Now, for every k ≤ min{i, r} let xi,k be the optimal bid in
[
sk, sk−1
]
, let pii,k =
pii (xi,k) and let j ∈ arg maxk pii,k. As xi,k is the optima bid in
[
sk, sk−1
]
, it
follows that xi,j is the optima bid in
[
smin{i,r}, s0
]
.
Proof of Theorem 8
Theorem 8. The expected bid of every bidder is:
E [bid] =
1
np
(1− λ (1 + p (n− 1))) (84)
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and the variance of the bid is:
Var [bid] =
1− (1− p)2n−1
(2n− 1)p −
(1− (1− p)n)2
n2p2
. (85)
The expected bid and the variance are neither monotonic in n nor in p.
Proof. As this case is a particular instance of the general case presented above,
we can characterize the CDF for every bidder —
Fn,p (x) =

1 x > 1− λ
(λ+x)
1
n−1 +p−1
p x ∈ [0, 1− λ]
0 x < 0
(86)
where λ = (1− p)n−1, which implies that the bidders’ PDF is:
fn,p (x) =
d
dx
Fn,p (x) =

0 x > 1− λ
(λ+x)
2−n
n−1
p(n−1) x ∈ [0, 1− λ]
0 x < 0
. (87)
The expected bid of every bidder is:
E [bid] =
∫ 1−λ
0
xfn,p (x) dx
= 1np (1− λ (1 + p (n− 1)))
(88)
which is neither monotonic in n nor in p.
The bid squared, in expectation, is:
E
[
bid2
]
=
∫ 1−λ
0
x2fn,p (x) dx
=
(
(λ+x)
1
n−1 λ2
p − 2 (λ+x)
n
n−1 λ
np +
(λ+x)
2n−1
n−1
(2n−1)p
)∣∣∣∣1−λ
0
= 1p
(
1
2n−1 − 2n (1− p)n−1 + (1− p)2n−2 − (1− p)2n−1 2(n−1)
2
n(2n−1)
)
(89)
hence,
V ar (bid) = E
[
bid2
]− E2 [bid]
= 1p
(
1
(2n−1) − 2n (1− p)n−1 + (1− p)2n−2 − (1− p)2n−1 2(n−1)
2
n(2n−1)
)
−
(
1
np
(
1− (1− p)n−1 (1 + p (n− 1))
))2
= 1−(1−p)
2n−1
(2n−1)p − (1−(1−p)
n)2
n2p2
(90)
which is, again, neither monotonic in n nor in p.
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Proof of Theorem 9
Theorem 9. The variance of the bidder profit is:
Var [BP ] =
n− 1
n (2n− 1) −
(1− p)n
n
+
(
p+
1
2n− 1
)
(1− p)2n−1 .
And the variance is monotonic increasing in p.
Proof. The squared of the bidder profit is:
E
[
BP 2
]
=
∫ 0
λ−1 z
2gBP (z) ∂z +
∫ 1
λ
z2gBP (z) dz
=
∫ 0
λ−1 z
2 (λ−z)
2−n
n−1
n−1 (1− (λ− z)) ∂z +
∫ 1
λ
z2 (λ+1−z)
1
n−1
n−1 dz
= (λ− z) 1n−1
(
λ(λ+2)(λ−z)
n +
(λ−z)3
3n−2 − λ2 − (2λ+1)(λ−z)
2
2n−1
)∣∣∣0
λ−1
+ (λ− z) 1n−1
(
(λ+ 1− z)
(
2λ+2
2n−1 − λ+1−z3n−2
)
− (λ+1)2n
)∣∣∣1
λ
= (λ− z) 1n−1
(
2λ(n−1)2
n(3n−2)(2n−1) − 2(n−1)
2
n(2n−1)
)
+ λ2 n−1n − λ 2(n−1)n(2n−1) + n−1(3n−2)(2n−1)
− (1− p)n
(
2λ2(n−1)2
n(3n−2)(2n−1) +
2λ(n−1)
n(2n−1) +
1
n
)
+λ
2
n +
2λ(n−1)
n(2n−1) +
2(n−1)2
n(3n−2)(2n−1)
= n−1n(2n−1) − (1−p)
n
n + (1− p)2n−2 − 2(n−1)2n−1 (1− p)2n−1 .
(91)
Hence the variance of the profit of every bidder is:
Var [BP ] = E
[
BP 2
]− E2 [BP ]
= n−1n(2n−1) − (1−p)
n
n +
(
p+ 12n−1
)
(1− p)2n−1 (92)
Differentiating the above with respect to p gives:
∂
∂p
V ar (BP ) = (1− p)n−1 − 2n · p (1− p)2n−2 . (93)
Now,
∂
∂pVar [BP ] ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
(1− p)n−1 − 2n · p (1− p)2n−2 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
p (1− p)n−1 ≤ 12n
(94)
since p (1− p)n−1 maximized when p = 1n ,
∂
∂pVar [BP ] ≥ 0 ⇐⇒(
1− 1n
)n−1 ≤ 12 (95)
which holds for every n ≥ 2. Therefore for every n ≥ 2 the variance of the
bidder profit increases with p.
39
Proof of Theorem 10
Theorem 10. The variance of the auctioneer in the max profit model is:
Var [AP ] = (1− p)2n−2 − 2n(1−p)n−12n−1 + n3n−2 − 2(n−1)
2(1−p)3n−2
(3n−2)(2n−1)
−
(
n
2n−1 +
n−1
2n−1 (1− p)2n−1 − (1− p)n−1
)2
.
(96)
Proof. The profit squared, in expectation, is:
E
[
AP 2
]
=
∫ 1−λ
0
x2 · nn−1 (λ+ x)
1
n−1 dx
= (λ+ x)
n
n−1
(
λ2 − λ 2n(λ+x)2n−1 + n(λ+x)
2
3n−2
)∣∣∣1−λ
0
= (1− p)2n−2 − 2n(1−p)n−12n−1 + n3n−2 − 2(n−1)
2(1−p)3n−2
(3n−2)(2n−1) .
(97)
Hence, the variance is:
Var [AP ] = (1− p)2n−2 − 2n(1−p)n−12n−1 + n3n−2 − 2(n−1)
2(1−p)3n−2
(3n−2)(2n−1)
−
(
n
2n−1 +
n−1
2n−1 (1− p)2n−1 − (1− p)n−1
)2
.
(98)
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